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Compliance

OWASP Agentic Top 10 Compliance

The OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications is the industry standard for identifying and mitigating security risks in autonomous AI agent systems. Published by the OWASP GenAI Security Project in December 2025, it defines the ten most critical risks observed in production agentic deployments.

Below is how Clevername maps to each risk — with specific controls, enforcement mechanisms, and the features that address them.

Total risks10 / 10All OWASP Agentic risks addressed
Fully covered8Multiple layered controls per risk
Partially covered2Core controls in place, advanced mitigations ongoing

Compliance Matrix

Each risk card shows the OWASP threat description, how Clevername addresses it, and which features provide the controls.

ASI01

Agent Goal Hijack

Covered
Threat

Attackers redirect agent objectives by manipulating instructions, tool outputs, or external content. Prompt injection, indirect injection via tool responses, and adversarial context manipulation can cause agents to abandon their intended task and pursue attacker-controlled goals.

How Clevername addresses this
CleverGuard 4-tier scanner (data-label gate, regex pattern shield, Gemma 3 4B ML classifier, LLM classification) scans every input and output in real time
ML classifier (Gemma 3 4B + LoRA) catches injection attempts that bypass regex; full governed pipeline (including the beta Tier-3 deep scan, which runs on every request for governed agents and escalates on ambiguity/disagreement for ungoverned traffic) reaches 94.8% detection / 14.75% FP across a 310-attack corpus (our own internal test set, not an independent third-party benchmark) — the always-on Tiers 0–2 baseline measured against live traffic is 94.7% / 2.66% FP, see /cleverguard
Agent Review guardrail profiles define allowed scope — goal deviation is blocked at the gateway
Drift detection flags scope violations against frozen review baseline
CleverGuard ScannerAgent ReviewDrift Detection
ASI02

Tool Misuse

Covered
Threat

Agents misuse legitimate tools due to prompt injection, misalignment, or unsafe delegation. An agent with access to a database tool might execute destructive queries, or a code execution tool might be used to exfiltrate data.

How Clevername addresses this
Scoped cnk_* tokens enforce per-agent tool allowlists — agents can only call explicitly permitted tools
Agent Review questionnaire compiles per-tool parameter constraints into guardrail profiles
Tool drift detection flags out-of-scope tool usage in real time, and blocks it (error code -32403) when enforcement is enabled
Budget caps prevent runaway API spend across tool calls
High-risk action patterns (A4) trigger automatic SignedApproval requests for human sign-off
Scoped TokensAgent ReviewDrift DetectionGateway
ASI03

Identity & Privilege Abuse

Covered
Threat

Attackers exploit inherited or cached credentials, delegated permissions, or agent-to-agent trust relationships. Over-privileged agents accumulate access beyond what their task requires.

How Clevername addresses this
Agent-key bindings enforce cross-agent credential isolation — agents cannot access another agent’s keys
BYOK storage in GCP Secret Manager with per-user scoping — keys are never shared across agents
Scoped tokens with tool allowlists, budget limits, and time expiry — least-privilege by default
Trust tier scoring (trusted/standard/elevated_review/untrusted) based on guardrail risk score
Key Interception strips credentials from prompts before they reach the LLM
Key InterceptionBYOKScoped TokensGateway
ASI04

Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

Covered
Threat

Malicious or tampered tools, MCP server descriptors, models, or agent personas compromise execution. Attackers can poison tool registries, inject malicious tool descriptions, or tamper with agent configurations.

How Clevername addresses this
MCP Marketplace with admin review before server activation
Reserved MCP server name blocklist prevents namespace hijacking
Agent Review version-hash revalidation — any change to agent config, tools, or bindings triggers re-review
Integration binding fingerprint included in version hash; drift triggers resubmit_required
Manifest verification for tool integrity
Agent ReviewMCP MarketplaceDrift Detection
ASI05

Unexpected Code Execution

Partially Covered
Threat

Agents generate or execute attacker-controlled code without proper sandboxing. Code injection through prompts or tool outputs can lead to arbitrary command execution on host systems.

How Clevername addresses this
CleverGuard scanner detects code injection and exfiltration command patterns
Tool allowlists restrict which execution tools an agent can access
Clevername governs tool calls but does not itself execute agent code — code execution stays in your own runtime, which you sandbox
URL blocklists prevent navigation to attacker-controlled endpoints
CleverGuard ScannerScoped Tokens
ASI06

Memory & Context Poisoning

Partially Covered
Threat

Persistent corruption of agent memory, RAG stores, or contextual knowledge. Attackers inject malicious content into long-term memory that influences future agent behavior across sessions.

How Clevername addresses this
CleverGuard scans all content entering agent context (input direction scanning)
Scanner detects injection attempts embedded in tool outputs and retrieved documents
Project file context is text-extracted and cached server-side — not user-editable at runtime
Guardrail profiles constrain what data sources each agent can access
CleverGuard ScannerAgent ReviewGateway
ASI07

Insecure Inter-Agent Communication

Covered
Threat

Spoofed, manipulated, or intercepted agent-to-agent communications. In multi-agent systems, compromised agents can send malicious instructions to other agents or intercept sensitive data in transit.

How Clevername addresses this
All agent traffic routed through Hub Core gateway — no direct agent-to-agent communication
TLS 1.3 encryption on all inter-service communication
Scoped tokens with tool allowlists prevent cross-agent capability escalation
Child token scope narrowing in multi-agent spawn trees
HMAC-signed audit trail provides tamper-evident chain of custody for all messages
GatewayScoped TokensAudit Trail
ASI08

Cascading Failures

Covered
Threat

Single-point faults propagate through multi-agent workflows at scale. One compromised or failing agent triggers chain reactions across dependent agents, amplifying damage exponentially.

How Clevername addresses this
Budget enforcement across spawn trees — aggregate spend tracked with $0.01 minimum reservation (TOCTOU fix)
Spawn policy enforcement: max depth and concurrency limits
Rate limiting (instance-count-aware) prevents cascading overload
Auto-restrict on drift score threshold stops compromised agents before damage spreads
90-day task retention with stale schedule auto-disable
GatewayDrift DetectionScoped Tokens
ASI09

Human-Agent Trust Exploitation

Covered
Threat

Agents exploit anthropomorphism and authority bias to manipulate users. Agents may confidently recommend risky actions, fabricate rationales, or socially engineer users into revealing secrets or approving dangerous changes.

How Clevername addresses this
Agent Review requires human quorum voting before any agent goes live
High-risk actions (A4 pattern matching) require explicit SignedApproval — no auto-approve for dangerous operations
Key Interception detects and strips credentials from user prompts before they reach the LLM
CleverGuard scans for social engineering and authority spoofing patterns
FP Dispute system provides human override of automated scanner decisions
Agent ReviewKey InterceptionCleverGuard Scanner
ASI10

Rogue Agents

Covered
Threat

Malicious or compromised agents deviate from their intended purpose, appear compliant on the surface, but pursue hidden goals or hijack workflows. Rogue agents may exfiltrate data, accumulate privileges, or undermine other agents.

How Clevername addresses this
Continuous drift detection compares every action against the frozen review baseline
Combined drift scoring with auto-restrict — agents exceeding thresholds are automatically suspended
Version-hash revalidation catches configuration tampering between governance and activation
Model drift detection flags unauthorized model changes
Full audit trail with HMAC signature chain — every action is logged and tamper-evident
SIEM forwarding (Splunk, Datadog, Elasticsearch, Sentinel) for external SOC monitoring
Drift DetectionAgent ReviewAudit TrailGateway
Our Approach

Why Clevername covers the full OWASP Agentic surface

Most AI security tools focus on one layer — scanning content after the fact, or checking identity at the door. Clevername operates across the entire agent lifecycle: from pre-deployment governance to continuous runtime enforcement to tamper-proof audit.

Pre-deployment governance

Every agent passes through the Agent Review — a human governance board with a 27-question security intake that compiles into machine-enforceable guardrail profiles. No agent activates without sign-off.

Inline enforcement

Clevername sits in the execution path, not alongside it. Every tool call, every LLM request, every agent action passes through our gateway where scoped tokens, scanner checks, and guardrail profiles are enforced before the action happens.

Continuous drift detection

Governance is not a one-time event. Clevername continuously compares agent behavior against the frozen review baseline. Tool drift, model drift, and scope violations trigger auto-restrict before damage spreads.

Tamper-proof audit

Every API call is logged with an HMAC signature chain. SIEM forwarding to Splunk, Datadog, Elasticsearch, and Sentinel provides independent verification. The chain of custody is unbreakable.

By the Numbers
4Scanner tiersData-label, regex, ML, LLM
94.8%Detection rateFull governed pipeline (incl. beta Tier-3) · 310-attack corpus
14.75%False-positive rateFull governed pipeline (incl. beta Tier-3) · internal eval
27Review questionsSecurity intake

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